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I

n various books and articles I have characterized the
Fundamental Question of Veterinary Medical Ethics as
“to whom does the veterinarian owe primary allegiance,
animal or owner?” There are two possible ideal answers
to this question. On the one hand, the veterinarian may
think of himself or herself as primarily obligated to the
animal in the manner of a pediatrician and a child. In this
model, though the parents pay the bills, the physician works
towards maximizing the child’s health and welfare; so too
the veterinarian is primarily obligated to the animal’s
well-being. It is thus not surprising that the profession of
pediatrics as a whole, has historically championed child
health and welfare, opposing such pathogenic practices
as child labor.
On the other hand, the veterinarian may see himself or
herself as fundamentally obligated to the client in the
manner of a garage mechanic. If a car owner says, “$1,000
to fix it? Trash it!”, the mechanic complies. Similarly, on
this view, the veterinarian exists to implement the client’s
wishes, (typically economic), regardless of what is in the
interests of the animal. In the real world, most veterinarian
work in various places along a spectrum between these
two extremes, but that does not negate their value as a
sound way of articulating ideals.
In my 30 years of involvement with veterinary medicine,
I have informally polled thousands of veterinarians
regarding their ideal. The vast majority lean towards
the pediatrician model and this is not surprising. In the
Republic and elsewhere, Plato ingeniously pointed out that
the role of any craftsman is to improve the material he or
she works their art upon. Thus a goldsmith adds value to
unworked gold; a carpenter increases the value of wood
by making it into furniture; a sculptor turns stone into art.
No such person should ever diminish the value of what
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he or she works on. If we think of medical professionals
as exercising their art to improve the value of the object
of their ministrations, plainly such people – physicians
or veterinarians – exist to improve what they work on.
Hence our horror at Nazi physicians or physicians who
collude in torture – they are seen as violating the very
nature of their profession. In the same way, veterinarians
who set up “hits” on race horses for owners to collect
insurance some years ago were viewed with horror and
disdain by the public and even by “seen it all” cynical law
enforcement personnel. In short, veterinarians may be
seen conceptually as existing to improve the health and
welfare of animals.
This view of veterinarians is easy to understand regarding
companion animals. It is now virtually a cliché that people
spend more on these animals than is justified by their
market value. As early as 1981, the Wall Street Journal
reported on people spending more than six figures on
their animals at the pioneering CSU animal cancer center
even if the economic value of the animal is $50. (Hence
the existence of a correlative national thrust on the
part of pet animal owners to increase compensation for
veterinary malpractice.)
But what of animals whose value is primarily economic,
such as laboratory animals or food animals? When I was
involved in writing the U.S. federal laws for laboratory
animals, the Congress was clear about placing laboratory
animal veterinarians as guardians of the well-being of
these animals, since these veterinarians were presumed
to have one foot in the science camp, but also to be
firmly situated as advocates for animal health and wellbeing. (This mandated advocacy goes well beyond what is
needed to assure good science.)
What of food animal practitioners? Under traditional,
husbandry-based agriculture, the veterinarian’s job was
to prevent disease, preserve good health, or, if necessary,
treat a sick animal if it was cost-effective to do so, or to
provide a good death if it was not.To succeed in traditional
agriculture to, one must put square pegs in square holes,
round pegs in round holes, and create as little friction as
possible while doing so. Animal productivity was closely
tied to animal health and welfare. A sick or stressed
animal could not produce optimally. But all this changed
when agriculture became industrialized in the mid-20th
century.
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For virtually all of human history, animal agriculture
was based foursquare in animal husbandry. Husbandry,
derived from the old Norse word “hus/bond” or bonded
to the household, meant taking great pains to put one’s
animals into the best possible environment one could find
to meet their physical and psychological natures (which,
following Aristotle, I call telos) and then augmenting their
ability to survive and thrive by providing them with food
during famine, protection from predation, water during
drought, medical attention, help in birthing, and so on.
Thus, traditional agriculture was roughly a fair contract
between humans and animals, with both sides being
better off in virtue of the relationship. So powerful is the
notion of husbandry, in fact, that when the Psalmist seeks
a metaphor for God’s ideal relationship to humans, he
seizes upon the shepherd in the 23rd Psalm:
The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want. He
maketh me to lie down in green pastures; He
leadeth me beside the still waters; He restoreth
my soul.
We wish no more from God than what the husbandman
provides for his sheep. In husbandry, a producer did
well if and only if the animals did well, so productivity
was tied to welfare. Thus, no social ethic was needed
to ensure proper animal treatment; only the anticruelty
ethic designed to deal with sadists and psychopaths was
needed to augment husbandry. Self-interest virtually
assured good treatment.
After World War II, this contract was broken by humans.
Symbolically, at universities, Departments of Animal
Husbandry became Departments of Animal Science,
defined not as care, but as “the application of industrial
methods to the production of animals” to increase
efficiency and productivity. With technological “sanders”
– hormones, vaccines, antibiotics, air handling systems,
and mechanization – we could force square pegs into
round holes and place animals into environments where
they suffered in ways irrelevant to productivity. If a 19th
century agriculturalist had tried to put 100,000 egg-laying
hens in cages in a building, they all would have died of
disease in a month; today, such systems dominate.
The new approach to animal agriculture was not the result
of cruelty, bad character, or even insensitivity. It developed

rather out of perfectly decent, prima facie plausible motives
that were a product of dramatic significant historical and
social upheavals that occurred after World War II. At
that point in time, agricultural scientists and government
officials became extremely concerned with supplying
the public with cheap and plentiful food for a variety of
reasons. In the first place, after the Dust Bowl and the
Great Depression, many people in the United States had
soured on farming. Second, reasonable predictions of
urban and suburban encroachment on agricultural land
were being made, with a resultant diminution of land
for food production. Third, many farm people had been
sent to both foreign and domestic urban centers during
the war, thereby creating a reluctance to return to rural
areas that lacked excitement; recall the song popular in
the 1940s: “How ya gonna keep ‘em down on the farm
after they’ve seen Paree?” Fourth, having experienced
the specter of starvation during the Great Depression,
the American consumer was, for the first time in history,
fearful of an insufficient food supply. Fifth, projection of
major population increases further fueled concern.
When the above considerations of loss of land and
diminution of agricultural labor are coupled with the
rapid development of a variety of technological modalities
relevant to agriculture during and after World War II
and with the burgeoning belief in technology-based
economics of scale, it was probably inevitable that animal
agriculture would become subject to industrialization.
This was a major departure from traditional agriculture
and a fundamental change in agricultural core values –
industrial values of efficiency and productivity replaced
and eclipsed the traditional values of “way of life” and
husbandry.
The traditional prevalence of husbandry agriculture
and the overwhelmingly predominant use of animals in
such agriculture more or less assured proper treatment,
as harming the animals or failing to put them into
circumstances they were biologically suited for would
harm their productivity and thus defeat owner selfinterest. The only societal ethic thus needed for animals
in such a world was one forbidding deliberate, sadistic,
willful, deviant infliction of pain and suffering on an animal
– embedded in the anti-cruelty laws, since self-interest
is a stronger sanction than law. But when agriculture
became industrialized, and society became aware of this
change, i.e. that farms were no longer Old McDonald’s
2009 Bovine Respiratory Disease Symposium Proceedings • 31
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farm and new non-husbandry based uses of animals such
as research toxicity testing and teaching had proliferated,
it demanded legislated assurance that all animals are wellcared for – hence the proliferation of animal-welfarerelated legislation--2,100 such bills proposed in the US
at the state level in 2004. This new demand changed the
social ethic to cover the industrialization of agriculture,
which is not cruelty, but still a source of suffering. It is
not an accident that the industry soft-pedals the change
in agriculture. Perdue poultry ran ads on the urban East
Coast for 15 years claiming that,“at Perdue we raise happy
chickens” and showing chickens and cows and horses in
a farmyard. In the same vein, ads for California cheese
depict idyllic cows on pasture, when in fact, as one dairy
practitioner told me; they never see a blade of grass.

her “huh”, I assume I did not make my point.

Current social ethics clearly directs farm animal
veterinarians towards the pediatrician model, by virtue of
its expectations regarding animal welfare. To understand
this point, one must examine the concept of “animal
welfare,” a concept grossly misunderstood by the intensive
agricultural industry and by veterinary medicine.

This notion was fraught with many difficulties. First of all,
productivity is an economic notion predicated of a whole
operation; welfare is predicated of individual animals.
An operation, such as caged laying hens may be quite
profitable if the cages are severely over-crowded yet the
individual hens do not enjoy good welfare. Second, as
we saw, equating productivity and welfare is, to some
significant extent, legitimate under husbandry conditions,
where the producer does well if and only if the animals
do well, and animals are fitted into environments creating
as little friction as possible. Under industrial conditions,
however, animals do not naturally fit in the niche or
environment in which they are kept, and are subjected to
“technological sanders” that allow for producers to force
animals into unnatural environments – antibiotics, feed
additives, hormones, air handling systems – so the animals
do not die and produce more and more kilograms of
meat or milk. Without these technologies, the animals
could not be productive. Before the development of
these technologies, producing animals in such systems
would have led to sickness and death.

When one discusses farm animal welfare with industry
groups or with the American Veterinary Medical
Association, one finds the same response – animal welfare
is solely a matter of “sound science”. Those of us serving
on the Pew Commission, better known as the National
Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production,
encountered this response regularly during our dealings
with industry representatives. This commission studied
intensive animal agriculture in the U.S. (PCIFAP.org).
For example, one representative of the Pork Producers,
testifying before the Commission, answered that while
people in her industry were quite “nervous” about the
Commission, their anxiety would be allayed were we
to base all of our conclusions and recommendations
on “sound science”. Hoping to rectify the error in that
comment, as well as educate the numerous industry
representatives present, I responded to her as follows:
“Madame, if we on the Commission were asking the
question of how to raise swine in confinement, science
could certainly answer that question for us. But that is not
the question the Commission, or society, is asking. What
we are asking is, ought we to raise swine in confinement?
And to this question, science is not relevant”. Judging by
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Questions of animal welfare are at least partly “ought”
questions, questions of ethical obligation. The concept
of animal welfare is an ethical concept to which, once
understood, science brings relevant data. When we ask
about an animal’s welfare, when the animal is used by
humans, we are asking about what we owe the animal, and
to what extent. A document called the CAST report, first
published by U.S.Agricultural scientists in the early 1980’s,
discussed animal welfare. It affirmed that the necessary
and sufficient conditions for attributing positive welfare to
an animal were represented by the animals’ productivity.
A productive animal enjoyed positive welfare; a nonproductive animal enjoyed poor welfare (CAST, 1981).

The key point to recall here is that even if the CAST
Report definition of animal welfare did not suffer from
the difficulties we outlined, it is still an ethical concept. It
essentially says “what we owe animals and to what extent
is simply what it takes to get them to create profit”. This
in turn would imply that the animals are well-off if they
have only food, water, and shelter, something the industry
has sometimes asserted. Even in the early 80’s, however,
there were animal advocates and others who would take
a very different ethical stance on what we owe farm
animals. Indeed, the famous five freedoms articulated in
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Britain by the Farm Animal Welfare view of what we owe
animals, when it affirms that:
“The welfare of an animal includes its physical and mental
state and we consider that good animal welfare implies
both fitness and a sense of well-being. Any animal kept
by man, must at least, be protected from unnecessary
suffering.
We believe that an animal’s welfare, whether on farm, in
transit, at market or at a place of slaughter should be
considered in terms of ‘five freedoms’

1. Freedom from Hunger and Thirst – by ready access to
fresh water and a diet to maintain full health and vigor.

2. Freedom from Discomfort – by providing an appropriate
environment including shelter and a comfortable resting
area.

3.  Freedom from Pain, Injury or Disease – by prevention
or rapid diagnosis and treatment.

4.  Freedom to Express Normal Behavior – by providing
sufficient space, proper facilities and company of the
animal’s own kind.

5. Freedom from Fear and Distress – by ensuring
conditions and treatment which avoid mental suffering.”
(FAWC 1979)
Clearly, the two definitions contain very different
notions of our moral obligation to animals (and there
is an indefinite number of other definitions). Which is
correct, of course, cannot be decided by gathering facts
or doing experiments – indeed which ethical framework
one adopts will in fact determine the shape of science
studying animal welfare.
To clarify: suppose you hold the view that an animal is
well-off when it is productive, as per the CAST Report.
The role of your welfare science in this case will be to
study what feed, bedding, temperature, etc. are most
efficient at producing the most meat, milk, or eggs for the
least money – much what animal and veterinary science
does today. On the other hand, if you take the FAWC
view of welfare, your efficiency will be constrained by the
need to acknowledge the animal’s natural behavior and

mental state, and to assure that there is minimal pain, fear,
distress and discomfort – not factors in the CAST view of
welfare unless they have a negative impact on economic
productivity. Thus, in a real sense, sound science does not
determine your concept of welfare; rather, your concept
of welfare determines what counts as sound science!
The failure to recognize the inescapable ethical component
in the concept of animal welfare leads inexorably to those
holding different ethical views talking past each other.
Thus, producers ignore questions of animal pain, fear,
distress, confinement, truncated mobility, bad air quality,
social isolation, and impoverished environment unless any
of these factors impact negatively on the “bottom line”.
Animal advocates, on the other hand, give such factors
primacy, and are totally unimpressed with how efficient
or productive the system may be
A major question obviously arises here. If the notion of
animal welfare is inseparable from ethical components,
and people’s ethical stance on obligations to farm animals
differ markedly across a highly diverse spectrum, whose
ethic is to predominate and define, in law or regulation,
what counts as “animal welfare”? This is of great concern
to the agriculture industry, worrying as they do about
“vegetarian activists hell-bent on abolishing meat”. In
actual fact, of course, such concern is misplaced, for the
chance of such an extremely radical thing happening is
vanishingly small. By and large, however, the ethic adopted
in society reflects a societal consensus, what most people
either believe to be right and wrong or are willing to
accept upon reflection.
Since 1978, I have devoted much of my career to
anticipating the emerging social ethic and explaining
it to veterinary medicine, industry, and the public. The
first point is that this ethic goes well beyond the ethic
of anti-cruelty – less than 1% of animal suffering results
from deliberate sadistic cruelty of the sort caused by the
cruelty laws. Whatever the source of animal suffering, be
it sadism or the quest for scientific knowledge or cheap
food, people wish to see it minimized. Secondly, they wish
to see the animal’s biological and psychological needs
and natures (what I call telos,) respected in use. Whereas
40 years ago I visited a zoo where the giraffe’s indoor
enclosure was such that the animal could not stand up,
today such a facility would not last a week. The public
rejection of violating animal nature is manifest in laws such
as California’s proposition 2, rejecting battery cages for
2009 Bovine Respiratory Disease Symposium Proceedings • 33
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laying hens, gestation crates for sows, and confined veal
in crates, or Arizona’s, Oregon’s, Florida’s, and Colorado’s
focus on sow stalls. Industry experts affirm that such
laws would pass in every state, and I convinced Smithfield
farms, the world’s largest pork producers, to phase out
sow stalls by calling their attention to emerging social
ethics for animals, which they verified by surveys and focus
groups. The Pew Commission report calls for elimination
of high confinement animal agriculture within a decade.
And the laboratory animal laws of 1985 I worked on for
10 years prior to their passage demand control of pain
and distress in research and teaching, and enrichment of
environment for laboratory animals.
In short, this new ethic demands that animals not
suffer uncontrolled pain or distress, that their teloi be
respected, and that the fairness inherent in the “ancient
contract” of husbandry be restored. This ethic provides
the ethical content to the concept of animal welfare, and
demands that it be guaranteed through the legal system.
A Gallup poll conducted in 2003 indicated that 75% of
the U.S. general public wished to see legislated assurance
of farm animal welfare. Insofar as societal demands apply
to veterinarians, it is clear that the societal ethic reaches
the same conclusion we derived from Plato – that
veterinarians work to improve the health and welfare of
animals of all sorts.
If veterinarians fail to perform this function for animals,
they lose their societal respect and indeed violate the
internal logic of being a veterinarian as opposed to a
mechanic. It is likely for this reason that what I have
called “scientific ideology” or the “common sense of
science” which derived the knowability of mental or
conscious states in animals was so widespread and so
different to dislodge. It is a violation of common decency
to cause pain, distress, fear, anxiety, discomfort, social
isolation to beings who are aware – this is manifestly true
for ordinary people. How much the truer would it be
for those whose life’s work involves caring for animals?
It was presumably comforting to scientists as it was to
Descartes to believe that what ordinary common sense
would call creating pain or other negative feelings in
animals was not really what it appeared to be, but simply
“nociception” or some other mechanical response. How
much the more so would it be to those whose focus
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is making animals better? Hence there was virtually no
acknowledgement of felt pain in science or veterinary
medicine. The first U.S. textbooks of anesthesia (Lumb,
1963; Lumb and Jones, 1973) do not mention felt pain or
that pain hurts or discuss analgesia
When introducing to Congress what became the 1985
U.S. laboratory animal laws mandating pain control, I was
asked by Congress to show that this was not being done
without the law. I responded by doing a literature search
for “laboratory animal analgesia” and finding no papers,
and when broadening the search to “animal analgesia”
found only two, one of which said there ought to be
papers. (Under pressure of federal law, the number of
papers has proliferated, as has use of analgesia.)
It is perhaps something like this ideological defense
mechanism that has allowed veterinary medicine to
avoid the conclusion of one of my food animal colleagues
that production diseases are “the shame of veterinary
medicine.” For while there is a huge literature on causes,
treatment, control, treatment, and nature of production
diseases, there is nothing on the ethics thereof. Yet,
manifestly, tolerating the very existence of production
diseases is a major ethical issue for veterinary medicine.
What are production diseases? They are pathological
conditions in an animal resulting exclusively or
overwhelmingly from the way the animal is bred for, used,
or kept in a production system. While the term originally
referred to metabolic diseases such as hypocalcemia in
dairy cattle, it is more reasonably deployed to cover
a variety of diseases – metabolic infections, genetic,
environmental and even behavioral. Production diseases
are largely a result of the intensification of agriculture.
As one book puts it, “Common production diseases
that affect dairy cattle such as ketosis, fatty liver, and
displaced abomasums, rarely, if ever, affect beef cows on
pasture.” (Drackley, 2006). As one early discussion put it:
“Production disease is a man-made problem; it consists
of a breakdown of the various metabolic systems of the
body under the combined strain of high production
and modern intensive husbandry.” (Payne, 1972) Shortly
thereafter, infectious and other diseases supplemented
metabolic diseases in the understanding of production
diseases.
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There is an indefinite number of such diseases. Many are
caused at least in part by univocal breeding exclusively for
production, such as lameness and reproductive problems
in dairy cattle, mastitis in dairy cattle, and skeleto-muscular
problems in broiler chickens. Others are caused in part
by crowding, such as tail-biting. Others came from failure
of the environment in which they are kept to respect the
animals’ biological nature, such as foot and leg problems
in cattle and swine, where animals evolved for pasture are
kept on concrete. Others such as cannibalism and feather
pecking in laying chickens and tail-biting in swine are also
caused by extreme confinement not allowing for escape
and establishment of normal dominance hierarchies. Still
others result from unnatural feeding practices, such as
liver and rumenal abscesses in feed-lot cattle. And while
BRD or shipping fever is multi-factorial, a major part of
its etiology is the stress of confinement and transport
and mixing of cattle. Pastoral beef cattle slaughtered near
home would not show current rates of shipping fever.
Much of shipping fever could be prevented by changing
genetics, but this would result in lower productivity so it
is not done. It is fair, then, to attribute many production
diseases to the industrialization of agriculture, and the
concomitant emphasis on production over all else, and the
tendency to put the animals into unnatural environments
or unnatural feeding regimes (cf. Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy or BSE.)

cattle. This disease leads to condemnation of 5 to 10%
of carcass livers at slaughter. It also affects the animals’
general health. (Nagaraja and Chengappa, 1998) (The
percentage would be much higher without tylosin). The
obvious answer is to modify the diet. But, producers
make more money with the grain diet even with the lost
carcasses than they would if they fed more grass. This is a
classic example of productivity failing to assure welfare!

Let us look more closely at a few representative
production diseases.

What are we to say of production diseases from an
ethical point of view? No one could possibly question
that, regardless of one’s definition of welfare, good health
is surely presuppositional to good welfare, and that
production diseases are thus inimical to good welfare.
And if the essence of veterinary medicine is to act like
a physician for animals, it clearly cannot accept treating
production diseases which are preventable by changing
the system of production. Often in the swine industry,
and regularly in the poultry and egg industries, individual
sick animals may not even be treated—“herd health” has
superseded treating individuals. It is conceptually and
morally impossible for veterinarians to accept systems
that make animals sick, rather than trying to change the
system. And we know that this can be done because
these diseases were of far less or no importance prior
to the advent of industrial agriculture. (To be fair, there
were other diseases prevalent, such as parasites in swine
raised outdoors. But such diseases were nowhere near
as serious or prevalent as current production diseases.

The most striking example I can think of occurs in the
use of geese for production of pate de foi gras. (This
disease predates the industrialization of agriculture.) The
geese are force-fed to deliberately produce the disease
known as fatty liver for the sake of creating a soft pate.
It is indicative of the neglect of such diseases from an
ethical point of view that AVMA has failed to speak
against the system. Even more indicative is the fact that
the 350 small print pages comprising the 110 papers in
the standard text, Production Diseases in Farm Animals,
not one chapter, paragraph or even sentence is devoted
to ethics. (Joshi and Herdt, 2006)
As mentioned earlier, another exazmple is provided by
rumenal and liver abscesses in fed cattle. Such abscesses
are a direct result of feeding too “hot” a grain diet, with
insufficient roughage. They occur in 12 to 32% of fed

And the subject of this conference represents yet
another example, as we just mentioned, since a major
factor in the advent of this disease is humanly-caused
stress. Other relevant manageable factors are crowding
(which facilitates transmission) and other stressful living
conditions combined with universal cow genetic selection
for production. A list of other production disease in
cattle is a dismal indictment of modern production
– ketosis, metritis, hypocalcaemia, laminitis, dystocia,
mastitis, foot and leg problems, reproductive problems,
displaced abomasums, fatty liver, retained placenta,
reproductive failure, and digital dermatitis. An univocal
selection for production has created osteoporosis and
cloacal prolapse in egg-laying hens, skeletal disorders in
chickens and turkeys, flip-over syndrome in broilers and,
historically, porcine stress syndrome in swine. (Though
the genetic component has been eliminated, the disease
is still prevalent due to environmental factors.)
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Furthermore, protection from parasites does not justify
wholesale violation of a pig’s telos.) I am not saying that
veterinarians should fail to treat sick animals that are
created by current production systems; in fact they need
to add more treating of individual animals to the current
emphasis on herd health. Most swine veterinarians do
not treat individual animals on large swine operations –
this work is assigned to stockpeople who may not be
adequately trained in diagnosis and treatment.. The same
is true in broilers and layers. But I am saying veterinary
medicine should not accept the status quo and band-aid
pathogenic systems. As my friend Tim Blackwell, chief
swine veterinarian for the province of Ontario puts it,
“We are obligated to treat (band-aid) the diseases, but
we are not obligated to defend the systems that created
these diseases.”
What should be done is for veterinarians, with the
support of the new social ethic, to pioneer in the redesign
of livestock production systems. Presuppositional to
such new systems must be the health and welfare of the
animals. When that is assured as a foundation, one can go
on to try to maximize profit. (Note that a total emphasis
on production does not necessarily entail profitability,
as for example has been shown in the dairy and swine
industries.)
Veterinarians alone, of course, cannot change these
pathogenic systems. But they can work to convince
producers that society will not tolerate these systems
much longer, and can lead in finding economically viable
modifications and alternatives. And organized veterinary
medicine must stop being the cheer-leaders for current
systems—witness AVMA saying that there are no better
and worse sow housing systems at the same time as
Smithfield eliminated gestation crates.
It is possible that such reform may result in higher food
prices. This is not necessarily the case – group housing
of swine costs 50% for capitalization of what gestation
crates cost. But it is certainly likely as one attempts to
restore good husbandry. So what? Americans spend only
some 10% of their income for food – Europeans spend
double that. Recent activity on behalf of animal welfare
such as Proposition 2 in California indicates the fact that
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public concern is not mitigated by threats of increased
prices – the egg industry lost soundly despite that ploy.
As the Federation of European Veterinarian affirmed
over 20 years ago, higher food prices are a small price to
pay to assure that the animals we consume have decent
lives. The public was not deterred from demanding law
protecting the interests of laboratory animals by dire
threats from the research community that such laws (i.e.
the laws of 1985 that I helped draft and defend) would
prevent discoveries that cure sick children. (In fact the
opposite is the case.)
When one couples the existence of production
disease with the other costs of industrial agriculture –
environmental despoliation, loss of sustainability, animal
and human disease, antibiotic resistance of pathogens,
the loss of small farms and farm communities, damage
to human and animal health, cheap food does not seem
so cheap; many of the costs are in fact externalized to
consumers. It is not a wonder that the PEW commission
on which I served for almost three years recommended
the abolition of high confinement industrial agriculture
within 10 years, and was greeted by much support from
the press. People realize that these problems must be
solved for the sake of a “livable future.” One of Pew’s
conclusions is that so-called “cheap food” is only
cheap at the register, while hidden costs are regularly
“externalized,” i.e. charged to the public in hidden ways.
Furthermore, I have sufficient faith in American ingenuity
to believe that agriculture can be recrafted to solve the
above problems and still provide food at a reasonable
price. We have never in fact tried – the last 50 years have
witnessed excessive emphasis on productivity. It is very
likely that agriculture can and will rise to the challenge
of reinvesting itself taking cognizance of the other values
hitherto neglected. It is fitting that veterinarians, who
should be guardians of animal health and welfare, lead
this change. If the industry fails to adjust, it risks loss
of autonomy and freedom as the public acts to rectify
what it finds abhorrent, but does not fully understand. As
the history of animal husbandry demonstrates, we raised
animals for 1000 years viewing disease as the enemy, not
as an ally in the quest for profit.
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